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Abstract
In many healthcare markets, physicians can respond to changes in reimbursement schemes by
changing the volume (volume response) and the composition of services provided (substitution
response). In this paper, we examine the relative importance of the volume and substitution
response in the context of physician drug dispensing. We use data on the market for ambulatory
care in Switzerland in which different dispensing regimes (banned/allowed) co-exist at the
regional level. Using doubly-robust regression and semiparametric quantile treatment effect
estimators, we find that dispensing increases drug costs by 52% for general practitioners and
56% for medical specialists. This increase is mainly due to a volume increase of about 56% for
general practitioners and 74% for specialists. The substitution response is negative on average
(around −4% for general practitioners and −20% for specialists), but not significantly different
from zero for large parts of the distribution. In other words, drug dispensing causes physicians
to sell more drugs but not to substitute towards more expensive drugs. In addition, our results
reveal substantial effect heterogeneity along the distribution.
Keywords: physician agency; drug expenditures; volume response; substitution response;
physician dispensing
JEL: I11, I18
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I. INTRODUCTION
Physicians have been shown to respond to changes in reimbursement schemes by changing
the volume (volume response, see Nguyen, 1996; Yip, 1998; Gruber et al., 1999; Hadley
and Reschovsky, 2006; Grant, 2009; Clemens and Gottlieb, 2014) and by changing the
composition of services provided (substitution response, see Van Doorslaer and Geurts,
1987; Hadley and Reschovsky, 2006). However, although it is very likely that (changes
in) reimbursement schemes simultaneously affect both the volume and the composition
of services, most of the literature analyzes the volume or the substitution response sepa-
rately.1
We provide some of the first market-level evidence on the relative importance of the
volume and the substitution response. Disentangling these two behavioral channels and
assessing their relative size is important as a change in the volume is likely to affect
health outcomes differently than a change in the composition of services provided. Thus,
quantifying the two responses is relevant for shaping policies to improve efficiency in
health care provision. More broadly, isolating these two channels contributes to a better
understanding of physician behavior in the presence of monetary incentives.
We study the volume and substitution response in the context of physician dispensing
regulations. Several OECD countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom,
Japan, and Switzerland, (partly) allow physicians to dispense drugs (i.e., to sell drugs
directly to their patients). Decomposing the volume and substitution response at the
market level is challenging. First, there must be exogenous variation in the dispens-
ing regulations that can be separated from variation in other institutional features such
as drug prices and health insurance coverage. Second, disentangling the two responses
generally requires detailed description-level information.
To address these challenges, we study the market for outpatient care in Switzerland.
The Swiss case is well-suited for our purposes because different drug dispensing regimes
1Jacobson et al. (2013) is a notable exception that finds an increase in the provision of chemotherapy
and a change in the mix of chemotherapy drugs administered in response to changed Medicare fees. These
findings may, however, not be generalizable as the study focuses on oncologists and cancer treatments
only.
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co-exist at the regional level, while many other important features, most notably prices
and insurance coverage, are regulated at the federal level. Another advantage of the Swiss
case is that we have access to a novel and comprehensive market-level dataset on physician
prescriptions. Our data contain detailed information about all prescriptions of approxi-
mately 60% of all physicians running independent practices in Switzerland. Importantly
for our purposes, for each prescription, we are able to identify pharmaceutical, dosage,
package size, price, as well as the defined daily dose. This information enables us to com-
pute the days supplied and the average price per day supplied for each physician. These
two variables are our main outcomes of interest and allow us to empirically disentangle
the volume and the substitution effect.
Using doubly robust estimators (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009) and controlling for a
rich set of physician characteristics and local demand conditions, we first document that
drug dispensing increases annual drug costs per patient on average by 52% for general
practitioners (GP) and by 56% for medical specialists. We then use our volume and price
measures to disentangle these overall effects into a volume response and a substitution re-
sponse. For both GPs and medical specialists we find positive and significant effects on the
drug volume of about 56% and 74%, while we find negative effects on average drug prices
(-4% and -20%). This clearly indicates that the volume response empirically dominates
the substitution response. While overall average effects provide a good starting point
for understanding physician behavior, they do not allow us to study effect heterogeneity,
which is particularly relevant for our market-level analysis. We therefore supplement the
average effect estimates with quantile effects, estimated using the semiparametric quantile
treatment effects estimator proposed by Firpo (2007). Our results show that the over-
all effect of dispensing on drug costs is increasing along the distribution. The quantile
treatment effects for the volume response exhibit very similar patterns, which provides
further evidence that the overall effect of dispensing is primarily driven by the volume
response. In contrast, the price effects are not significantly different from zero at most
quantiles. However, we estimate significantly negative effects at the upper tail, resulting
in the negative average effects. Thus, the substitution response becomes relatively more
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important at the upper tail. In summary, our quantile effect estimates reveal substantial
treatment effect heterogeneity, suggesting that average effects miss a great deal. This
finding is even more pronounced for specialists than for GPs, reflecting the heterogeneous
composition of this group of physicians. Our findings are robust across a wide range of
alternative volume and price measures.
Our paper is related to the literature studying the impact of different dispensing regu-
lations on healthcare expenditures. The analysis conducted by Chou et al. (2003) suggests
that drug expenditures per visit substantially decreased after the implementation of a dis-
pensing ban in Taiwan. Beck et al. (2004) and Dummermuth (1993) compare aggregated
cantonal expenditures and find that dispensing physicians in Switzerland trigger more
drug expenditures per patient than non-dispensing physicians. Similar results are found
for dispensing physicians in Lincolnshire (United Kingdom) by Baines et al. (1996). Kaiser
and Schmid (2016) corroborate the earlier findings on Switzerland using more detailed
physician-level data.2 Our study also relates to the literature on physician behavior in
the presence of monetary incentives (see McGuire, 2000, and Chandra et al., 2012, for
two extensive overviews) and prescription practices (e.g., Hellerstein, 1998; Coscelli, 2000;
Lundin, 2000; Park et al., 2005; Iizuka, 2007; Lim et al., 2009; Rischatsch et al., 2013;
Iizuka, 2012; Filippini et al., 2014). However, none of the previous studies decomposes
the overall effect into a volume response and a substitution response.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we describe the
institutional background. Section III discusses our identification strategy and presents
the estimation approaches. In Section IV, we describe the construction of our dataset,
determine common support, present descriptive statistics, discuss our empirical results,
and provide additional robustness checks. Section V concludes. All figures and tables are
collected in the appendix. In addition, the appendix contains an overview of the cantonal
dispensing regulations and a detailed description of our dataset.
2Trottmann et al. (2016) use patient-level data to analyze physician dispensing in Switzerland. Their
results do, however, not allow to draw any conclusion regarding physician prescription behavior or overall
health care expenditures.
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II. THE MARKET FOR AMBULATORY CARE IN SWITZERLAND
The healthcare system in Switzerland can broadly be categorized as managed competi-
tion.3 On the demand side, basic health insurance is mandatory for all Swiss residents.
Mandatory health insurance is offered by about 60 private insurance companies, which
are subject to strong regulations. First, insurers cannot make profit based on mandatory
insurance and mandatory insurance needs to be separated from any voluntary supple-
mentary insurance. Second, insurance providers are obliged to accept all individuals who
wish to enroll.4 Third, health insurance providers are de facto obliged to contract with all
authorized health care providers and, in particular, with all physicians running indepen-
dent practices. Finally, patients can in principle freely choose their doctors.5 The basic
health insurance coverage is quite comprehensive and includes most ambulatory services,
inpatient care, physiotherapy, prescription drugs, and old-age care. The contract period
for basic health insurance generally corresponds to the calendar year, i.e., patients can
change their insurer or health plan annually. Patients can freely choose between different
contracts with deductible levels ranging from CHF 300 to CHF 2500. After exceeding
their respective deductible level, patients face a co-payment rate of 10%, which decreases
to zero once the sum of the co-payments exceeds CHF 700.6
On the supply side, the pharmaceutical market in Switzerland is regulated on the
federal level with respect to the approval and pricing of prescription drugs as well as
the approval and the pricing of all the drugs that are reimbursable by the basic health
insurance. Specifically, a positive list defines all the drugs that are reimbursable by basic
health insurance (list of pharmaceutical specialties). This list is adapted at least once
per month and specifies, inter alia, two prices for each drug: an ex-factory price and a
3Our summary draws on the extensive summary of the compulsory health insurance in Switzerland
by Schmid et al. (2017) and on Kaiser and Schmid (2016) to whom we refer for more details on the
pharmaceutical market in Switzerland.
4Prospective risk equalization compensates insurers for differences in the risk profiles of their cus-
tomers; see for example Van de Ven et al. (2013) for a detailed description.
5Health insurance providers are allowed to offer managed care contracts such as health maintenance
organization (HMO) health plans and preferred provider organization (PPO) health plans that restrict
the patients’ provider choice in exchange for lower premiums.
6Deductible levels are between zero and CHF 600 for children (aged 18 and younger). In general, the
stop-loss amount for children is CHF 350.
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retail public price. A dispensing physician charges his patients the retail price plus 2.5%
VAT such that the gross profit margin corresponds to the difference between the retail
and the ex-factory price, which are both regulated on the federal level. A key feature is
that the absolute markup increases with the ex-factory price such that the incentives to
overprescribe increase with the drug price (Kaiser and Schmid, 2016, Table A.II).
Although most aspects of the Swiss pharmaceutical market are regulated on the federal
level, drug dispensing rules are determined on the cantonal level, thus providing an ideal
setup for analyzing the effect of financial incentives on physician prescription behavior.
Most of these regulations have been in place for several decades (Table 13 provides an
overview of the dispensing regulations in the 26 Swiss cantons). Dispensing physicians
charge patients for the medical services provided and the retail price for dispensed pre-
scription drugs, while non-dispensing physicians only charge patients for medical services.
If a physician is not dispensing, he or she issues a prescription note that entitles the
patient to buy the drug at a pharmacy. The pharmacists charges the patient the retail
price plus some additional consultation fees and 2.5% VAT. In contrast to physicians,
pharmacies are never allowed to issue prescriptions, but they can sell prescription drugs.
As a consequence, doctors are the gatekeepers to the prescription drug market. That is,
every patient must necessarily visit a physician to obtain prescription medication, which
is crucial for our analysis because it mitigates concerns that the analysis is confounded
by differences in the availability of pharmacies and implies that the prescription costs of
dispensing and nondispensing physicians can be adequately compared.
III. METHODOLOGY
III.A. Identification
To describe our identification strategy, we use the potential outcomes framework (cf.
Rubin, 1974). Let the indicator Di denote the dispensing status of physician i, i.e.,
Di = 1 for dispensing physicians and Di = 0 for non-dispensing physicians. Let Ydi
denote the potential outcome of physician i associated with dispensing status Di = d. We
are interested in the average treatment effect (ATE) and the average treatment effect on
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the treated (ATT):
∆ = E (Y1i − Y0i) , (1)
∆Di=1 = E (Y1i − Y0i|Di = 1) . (2)
To quantify the effect heterogeneity along the outcome distribution, we supplement our
average effects with quantile treatment effects. We consider quantile treatment effects
(QTE) and quantile treatment effects on the treated (QTT),
δ(τ) = QY1i(τ)−QY0i(τ), (3)
δDi=1(τ) = QY1i|D=1(τ)−QY0i|D=1(τ), (4)
where τ denotes the quantile index. We note that these quantile effects provide a complete
description of the distributional impact of dispensing and thus allows us to document and
analyze effect heterogeneity.
Without additional assumptions, both average and quantile treatment effects are not
identified from our data because counterfactual outcomes are unobserved. In this paper,
we exploit regional variation (between and within cantons) in the dispensing regime and
achieve identification through the conditional independence assumption (CIA). Let Xi
denote a vector of observable covariates that contains the characteristics of physician i,
information about his or her patients, and health care market conditions prevalent at his
or her practice location; see Section IV.A for a detailed description of all covariates. The
CIA asserts that conditional on these observable characteristics Xi, the dispensing status
Di is independent of the potential outcomes:
(Y1i, Y0i) ⊥ Di|Xi. (5)
Section III.B discusses the validity of this key condition in the context of our analysis. To
obtain identification based on Assumption (5), we need the impose the following common
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support assumption
0 < p(x) < 1, ∀x ∈ supp(X), (6)
where p(x) ≡ P (Di = 1|Xi = x) is the propensity score. Assumption (6) asserts that for
every value of Xi, we can match dispensing with nondispensing physicians. Assumption
(6) is testable and we address its validity in Section IV.B. Under Assumptions (5) and
(6) the average and quantile treatment effects are identified (e.g., Imbens, 2004; Firpo,
2007).
III.B. Plausibility Of The Conditional Independence Assumption
The key condition underlying our identification strategy is the CIA. Although this assump-
tion is fundamentally untestable, we argue that it is likely to hold in our context because
of the following aspects (see also Kaiser and Schmid, 2016). First, dispensing policies are
predetermined on the cantonal level such that the physicians’ ability to influence their
treatment assignment is strongly restricted. Second, the current dispensing regulations
are rooted in historical differences in cantonal health care policy. Table 13 documents
that most dispensing regulations have been in place for several decades.7 This mitigates
concerns that the current regimes are endogenous outcomes of unobserved dispensing
preferences. Although we cannot completely exclude the possibility that unobserved re-
gional preferences for drug policies have a persistent impact until today, we argue that
the degree of persistence necessary to threaten our design is unlikely. Third, physician
training in Switzerland is centralized at a few locations at all of which dispensing was not
allowed during our study period. This mitigates concerns that differences in physician
training between regions with different dispensing regimes confound our analysis. Fourth,
many institutional features, including the positive list of prescription drugs covered by
mandatory health insurance, drug prices and markups, and health insurance regulations,
are determined by federal regulations and are therefore guaranteed not to confound our
7The only exception is the canton of Zürich, where physician dispensing was allowed in the two
largest cities within the last year of our study (May 2012). Because we have annual data, we exclude all
observations of physicians that are located in these two cities in 2012.
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analysis. Finally, we control for a comprehensive set of factors that are potentially related
to the dispensing status and potential outcomes, namely for physician characteristics, pa-
tient pool compositions, and healthcare market conditions in the practice location (see
Section IV.A for more details). This eliminates any bias that arises if those factors jointly
affect the dispensing status and the potential outcomes.
III.C. Estimation
There are different approaches for estimating average treatment effects under Assumptions
(5) and (6) (e.g., Imbens, 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009; Imbens and Rubin, 2015).
Here we use doubly-robust regression, a method that combines regression with propensity
score weighting. The main advantage of this method is that it provides better protection
against misspecification than procedures relying on either the propensity score or on
regression alone, because it achieves consistency under two separate sets of assumptions.
Doubly robust regression is consistent if either the propensity score or the outcome model
is correctly specified, or both (e.g., Wooldridge, 2007; Robins et al., 2007). Estimation
proceeds in four steps:
1. Estimate the propensity score using parametric logit models and compute the pre-
dicted probabilities p̂(Xi).
2. Construct propensity score weights λ(Xi) =
(
Di
p̂(Xi)
+ 1−Di
1−p̂(Xi)
)
for the ATE and
λDi=1(Xi) =
(
Di +
p̂(Xi)
1−p̂(Xi)(1−Di)
)
for the ATT.
3. Choose parametric models for the mean functions of the treated and non-treated
physicians, m(Xi, β
1) andm(Xi, β
0) for the ATE andm(Xi, β
1
Di=1
) andm(Xi, β
0
Di=1
)
for the ATT. The coefficients of the mean functions are obtained as the solutions of
the following inverse probability weight augmented moment conditions:
∑
i:Di=d
λ̂(Xi)
[
Yi −m(Xi, β̂d)
]
Xi = 0, for d ∈ {0, 1}, (7)
∑
i:Di=d
λ̂Di=1(Xi)
[
Yi −m(Xi, β̂dDi=1)
]
Xi = 0, for d ∈ {0, 1}. (8)
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4. Estimate the ATE and ATT as follows
∆̂ =
1
n
∑
i
m
(
Xi, β̂
1
)
−m
(
Xi, β̂
0
)
∆̂Di=1 =
1
n1
∑
i:Di=1
m
(
Xi, β̂
1
Di=1
)
−m
(
Xi, β̂
0
Di=1
)
,
where n1 =
∑
iDi is the number of treated physicians.
In our empirical analysis, we consider two different mean functions m(·, ·): a linear model
in which case (7) and (8) become weighted least squares (WLS) estimators, and an ex-
ponential model in which case (7) and (8) are the weighted Poisson quasi-maximum-
likelihood estimator (WPQML); see, e.g., Wooldridge (2007) for more details.
The quantile treatment effects are estimated using the semiparametric estimation ap-
proach proposed by Firpo (2007). Estimation proceeds in two steps:
1. Construct the propensity score weights λ̂(Xi) and λ̂Di=1(Xi) as described before.
8
2. Obtain QTE and QTT from weighted quantile regressions
(
δ̂(τ), Q̂Y0i(τ)
)
= arg min
δ,Q
1
n
∑
i
λ̂(Xi)ρτ (Yi −Diδ −Q)
and
(
δ̂Di=1(τ), Q̂Y0i|Di=1(τ)
)
= arg min
δ,Q
1
n
∑
i
λ̂Di=1(Xi)ρτ (Yi −Diδ −Q) ,
where ρτ (u) = u(τ − 1{u < 0}) is the check function.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
IV.A. Data Sources And Variables
We use physician-level data on drug prescriptions for the years 2008− 2012. The data is
provided by the operator of the nationwide database of Swiss health insurers (Sasis AG)
8In this paper, the weights are constructed based on the same parametric propensity score estimates
as used for the average effects.
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and identifies each physician by the so-called Global Location Number (GLN). This allows
us to link it to complementary data from the register of medical personnel (MedReg). This
register contains personal information on each physician such as the dispensing permission
indicator (treatment indicator Di) and the practice location. Additionally, we observe
gender, nationality, age, experience, and the medical specialty of each physician.
Our data includes prescriptions triggered by self-employed GPs and specialists who
deliver outpatient care in private practices in the German speaking part of Switzerland.
For each prescription, we observe the gross drug costs and identify the prescribing physi-
cian as well as the pharmaceutical (pharmacode). The drug costs are either direct costs
induced by dispensing physicians or indirect costs originating from prescriptions filled
in pharmacies. Using the identifier for the pharmaceutical, we are able to merge each
prescription to the list of pharmaceutical specialties provided by the Federal Office of
Public Health (FOPH) and, in addition, to the anatomical therapeutic chemical (ATC)
classification system established by the World Health Organization (WHO). Therefore,
for each prescribed or dispensed pharmaceutical, we know the dosage, the package size,
the ex-factory and retail prices, the active pharmaceutical ingredients, the ATC code, and
the defined daily dose (DDD). Similar to Liu et al. (2009, 2012), we use the information
on DDD and prices to construct volume and price measures. More precisely, we calculate
days supplied (per patient) and the average price per day supplied for each physician in
our data. These two measurers are our main outcomes of interest.
The health insurance data further contains information on the physicians’ pool of pa-
tients, which allows us to control for differences in patient compositions. In particular, we
observe the patients’ residence, age, gender, as well as their health plan and deductible
level. Knowing the patients’ residence, we additionally control for location-specific het-
erogeneity by exploiting municipality level averages provided by the Swiss Federal Finan-
cial Administration (SFFA), the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO), and the Swiss
Household Panel (SHP). Using these data sources, we observe the population density, the
share of foreigners, urbanity, the unemployment rate, mean education levels, income per
capita, physician density, the share of individuals with very good, good, average, and bad
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self-reported health status, and the mean Body Mass Index (BMI). As physicians draw
patients from different municipalities, we control for a physician’s average patient compo-
sition by weighted averages over municipalities. The weights correspond to the number
of patients within each municipality.
There are two types of drug costs that are not part of our data. First, we do not observe
out-of-pocket expenditures that are not reported to the insurers. In all likelihood this is
only the case for patients with both low healthcare expenditures and high deductibles
(see Schmid, 2017). Second, there are some over-the-counter products that do not require
prescriptions and, therefore, cannot be linked to a physician. Their relevance, however,
is limited because only few of the drugs covered by mandatory health insurance are over-
the-counter products (Kaiser and Schmid, 2016).9
IV.B. Determining Common Support
Treatment effects can only be identified and estimated for dispensing physicians for whom
we observe similar non-dispensing physicians (Assumption (6)). That is, we need overlap
in the covariate distributions of treatment and control units. This is achieved using the
approach proposed by Crump et al. (2009). Their methodology is purely data driven, does
not depend on outcome variables, and requires a first-step estimation of the propensity
score, denoted by p̂(x). In the second step, treatment effects are estimated using the
common support sample of observations with p̂(x) ∈ [α̂, 1 − α̂] only, where the cutoff
parameter α̂ ∈ [0, 1/2] is chosen optimally such that average treatment effects can be
estimated most precisely. Using the algorithm of Crump et al. (2009), we estimate α̂ =
0.103 (α̂ = 0.096) for GPs (specialists) and drop 17% (31%) of the observations. Figure
1 shows the estimated propensity scores for the full samples of GPs and specialists as
well as for their common support samples. In contrast to the full samples, the common
support samples, i.e., panels (c) and (d), do no longer exhibit probability mass at the
boundary points 0 and 1. This means that it is no longer the case that for some covariate
values, the treatment status is (almost) perfectly predicted.
9Examples include painkillers with low dosage or certain herbal products.
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Table 1 additionally shows the impact of the cutoff parameter on the normalized
difference of covariate means by dispensing status.10 This difference is more convenient
than t-statistics because an increase in the sample size does not systematically affect the
normalized difference (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). For GPs as well as specialists,
the normalized differences are significantly lower in the common support samples, which
shows that the covariate distributions are indeed more balanced.
IV.C. Descriptive Statistics
Tables 2 and 3 show the descriptive statistics for the common support samples of GPs
and specialists. These samples consist of 3918 GPs and 3488 specialists, most of whom
are observed in each of the years 2008 to 2012, leading to panels of 16291 and 12799
observations. To take differences in the number of patients into account, the dependent
variables drug costs and drug volume are measured in per-patient terms. The third
outcome of interest, the average drug price, does not require an adjustment to the number
of patients.
Average drug costs per patient and year are 196 Swiss Francs for dispensing GPs,
which is 71 Swiss Francs higher than for non-dispensing GPs. This difference of 57%
is exceeded by a 65% higher drug volume triggered by dispensing GPs, whereas average
drug prices are 11% lower for the latter. For specialists, the percentage cost differences by
dispensing status are somewhat smaller. That is, average drug costs per patient are 48%
higher for dispensing than for nondispensing specialists. Nevertheless, the per-patient
drug volume is 66% higher for dispensing than for nondispensing specialists, whereas
average drug prices are even 18% lower for dispensing specialists.
Overall, Tables 2 and 3 suggest that physician characteristics and patient pool vari-
ables are well balanced between dispensing and non-dispensing physicians. There is one
exception: dispensing physicians are less often located in urban regions than their nondis-
pensing colleagues. That is, physician density, the fraction of urban area, and the popu-
lation density are on average lower for dispensing physicians. Nevertheless, we argue that
10Normalized differences are computed as (x̄j1 − x̄j0)/
√
V̂j1 + V̂j0, where x̄jd and V̂jd are the sample
mean and the sample variance of the subsamples with Di = d ∈ {0, 1}.
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this is not a threat to our analysis. First, there is sufficient variation in the dispensing
regime within rural areas (see Table 13) as well as within urban areas.11 Second, the frac-
tion of urban area, physician density, and population density are included as covariates
in each model and are therefore able to capture potential differences in the outcomes that
are related to these factors.
IV.D. Causal Effects Of Dispensing
In this section, we report estimates of the causal effect of dispensing on physician behavior.
The first outcome variable of interest, drug costs per patient, quantifies the overall average
effect of dispensing on drug costs. The contribution of this paper is to subsequently
decompose this overall effect into a volume response and a substitution response, that is,
we estimate the causal effect of dispensing on days supplied per patient (‘drug volume’)
and average price per day supplied (‘drug price’). In addition, we estimate unconditional
quantile treatment effects to further analyze the effect heterogeneity in the causal effect
of dispensing.
We examine GPs and medical specialists separately. The covariates included in our
models are essentially the same as presented in Table 1. That is, we control for individual
characteristics of physicians, the composition of patients treated by a physician (age
groups, type of insurance contracts, gender), and local health care market conditions
(physician density, urbanity, average health status, average education levels, income per
capita, etc.). Therefore, differences in these factors across cantons are captured by the
included covariates. We additionally include year fixed effects as we have pooled data
for the years 2008 − 2012 and exclude the number of patients as well as the number
of visits as two of our outcomes are per patient measures. To compute standard errors
and confidence bands, we employ the block bootstrap to account for the potential serial
correlations within clusters (i.e., physicians observed for more than one year) and the
uncertainty associated with the first-step estimation of the propensity score.
11Indeed, our sample contains physicians located in several cities that permit physician dispensing
(e.g., Lucerne, St. Gallen, Solothurn) as well as physicians located in cities that fully ban dispensing
(e.g., Bern, Basel, Aarau).
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1. Average Treatment Effects. For all outcomes, we report doubly-robust estimates
of the ATE and the ATT based on WLS and WPQML separately for the GPs in Table
4 and the specialists in Table 5. Before discussing these results in more detail, we would
like to highlight three general findings. First, the estimated size of the selection effect,
defined as the difference between the unadjusted difference and the ATT, is small and
not statistically significant. This indicates that selection is a minor issue in the context
of our study (conditional on the validity of the CIA). Second, the ATE and the ATT
are numerically similar and not significantly different. Third, the differences between
WLS and WPQML are small compared to the confidence intervals. Table 6 further
demonstrates that our doubly-robust estimates are comparable to the estimates based on
three alternative estimators: ordinary least squares, Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood,
and inverse probability weighting. We therefore conclude that our findings are robust
with respect to the choice of the econometric method. Given these general findings, we
henceforth primarily focus on the estimates based on WLS and the average effects within
the population of dispensing physicians (ATT).
Regarding the overall effect, the estimated ATT for GPs reported in the left column
of Table 4 suggests that dispensing raises average drug costs per patient by CHF 65 or
52%. The estimated effects for medical specialists are very similar in relative terms, that
is, dispensing raises drug costs per patient by 56%, even though the absolute effect is
somewhat smaller and amounts to CHF 48 (see left column of Table 5). Our results
with respect to drug costs are generally in line with the existing studies (see Kaiser and
Schmid, 2016). Turning to the decomposition of this overall effect, we find a large positive
and significant volume effect of 56% for the dispensing GPs. In contrast, the substitution
effect of −4% is small and negative but still significant in statistical terms. In other
words, dispensing increases the days supplied per patient by roughly 87 but decreases the
price per day supplied by a tiny 4 cent. Regarding medical specialists, we estimate that
dispensing increases the days supplied per patient by roughly 38 (74%) and decreases the
average price per day supplied by 38 cent (−20%). Compared to GPs, we thus find a
similar qualitative pattern though the relative effects are larger. Overall, these results
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strongly suggest that the volume effect empirically dominates the substitution effect. In
other words, drug dispensing causes physicians to sell more drugs but not to substitute
towards more expensive drugs.
2. Quantile Treatment Effects. To examine the overall effect, the volume and sub-
stitution effect in more detail, we estimate unconditional quantile treatment effects based
on the Firpo (2007)-estimator. Figure 2 displays QTE and QTT estimates for our three
main outcomes both for GPs and medical specialists. Looking at Figure 2 (a), we find
that the overall effect of dispensing on drug costs in the GP population is nonconstant
and increasing, ranging from roughly zero at the 5%-quantile up to almost CHF 100 at
the 95%-quantile. However, the effect is primarily increasing below the median and nearly
constant afterwards. Regarding medical specialists, Figure 2 (b) shows a quite different
pattern, that is, the overall effect of dispensing on drug costs is small positive in the lower
tail up to the center of the distribution and exhibits a steep increase up to CHF 200 in the
upper tail. These findings are indicative of substantial heterogeneity in the causal effect
of dispensing along the outcome distribution. The results differ considerably between
GPs and medical specialists, which is in line with our intuition as medical specialists are
inherently a very diverse physician population.
Turning to the volume effects shown in Figure 2 (c) for GPs and in Figure 2 (d) for
specialists, the QTE (and QTT) estimates exhibit very similar patterns compared to the
ones shown in Figure 2 (a) and (b). In other words, we find further evidence that the
overall (cost) effect of dispensing is primarily driven by the volume effect. In contrast,
the causal effect of dispensing on average drug prices is roughly constant and insignificant
across most quantiles. However, we estimate substantial and significantly negative effects
at the upper tail. Thus, although the volume effect dominates the substitution effect in
the lower parts of the distribution, the substitution effect seems to affect drug costs at
the upper tail. Interestingly, the substitution response exhibits a similar pattern for GPs
and medical specialists but the effect is more pronounced for specialists. This corresponds
to our finding that the average substitution response is larger for the medical specialists.
In any event, we find again evidence that the volume response empirically dominates the
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substitution response. Furthermore, our results demonstrate that average effects miss a
great deal and thus highlight the importance of examining treatment effect heterogeneity
using quantile treatment effects.
3. Discussion. Given that the markup increases with the price, the negative sub-
stitution response is somewhat puzzling. Rischatsch et al. (2013) find that dispensing in
Switzerland is associated with higher use of generics, but the authors do not provide any
explanation for this result. One potential explanation is that dispensing physicians have
better knowledge about drugs (e.g. generic market entry) than their drug prescribing
peers. Although not implausible, mere knowledge does not necessarily provide incentives
to dispense cheaper drugs. However, the markup increases in a step-wise fashion, that
is, the absolute markup exhibits several jumps and is finally capped at CHF 240 per
package. On the one hand, substituting drugs between the jumps can affect the markup
much less than substitution across these jumps. Rischatsch (2013) analyzes three active
pharmaceutical ingredients (API) and finds that Swiss physicians seem to optimize the
markup by dispensing small packages instead of larger ones. They find that the price per
dose increases by 3 − 5%, which provides some evidence that physicians indeed exploit
the jumps.12 On the other hand, the incentive for markup optimization declines with the
price and vanishes at the markup cap. Thus, physicians possibly choose the less expen-
sive drug if the options are financially similar attractive. Such a behavior would perfectly
explain the negative effects depicted in Figure 2 (e) and (f) at the upper tail, that is, for
the most expensive drugs. Although this provides an explanation for the estimates, the
incentives for physicians to dispense less expensive drugs remain unknown.
IV.E. Robustness Checks: Alternative Volume And Price Measures
Defined daily doses (DDDs) are very appealing because one can easily calculate and
aggregate drug volumes, and estimates based on such a volume measure have a direct
interpretation. However, in terms of expenditures, DDDs are only available for roughly
12In our setup, such a behavior would have no effect on the volume, but a negative effect on the price
in the lower part of the distribution as smaller packages tend to have lower ex-factory prices. However,
by separately analyzing API one ignores substitutability and thus a possibility for markup optimization.
Nevertheless, we find some evidence that corroborates these findings, see IV.E.2.
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three fourths of all drugs in our data. Therefore, we examine the robustness of our results
by considering alternative measures of drug volumes and prices.
1. Variable Construction. The alternative measures are mostly based on active
pharmaceutical ingredients (API) and constructed as follows.
Price measures: we construct a ‘normalized price’ for each drug package by dividing
the retail price per unit of the API by the lowest price in our dataset for the unit of the
API. Stated differently, we determine the drug price relative to the cheapest drug with
the same API.13 The physician’s average price is then calculated as the weighted average
of all normalized prices using the number of all prescriptions (includes dispensing) as
weights. Thus, the average price is a relative measure (relative to a scenario where the
physician prescribes the cheapest drug). In addition to the average normalized price, we
also compute simple average ex-factory and retail prices.
Volume measures: We construct a ‘normalized volume’ for each drug package by
dividing each package’s content in terms of API by the content of the smallest package with
the same API. The physician’s volume is then calculated by multiplying the number of all
prescriptions (includes dispensed drugs) by the normalized volume and then aggregating
over all prescriptions. Thus, the normalized volume increases if the physician dispenses
or prescribes (a) an additional drug package or (b) the package content in terms of API
increases. However, it does not increase if the physician decides, for instance, to dispense
two small packages instead of one large package as long as the two choices are equal in
terms of the API content. One potential issue with the normalized volume measure is that
it depends on the relative size of the different drug packages. We therefore also construct
an index for each API running from one for the smallest package to two for the largest
package. The ‘volume index’ is then constructed in the same way as the normalized
volume measure. As a result, it exhibits basically the same desirable properties, but does
not depend on the relative size of the different drug packages.
13This procedure takes into account that for most drugs different package sizes and dosages are avail-
able.
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2. Results. We re-estimate the average effects of dispensing on drug costs per pa-
tient, drug volume per patient, and average prices using the same specification as in
Section IV.D. The re-estimated effects of physician dispensing using alternative price and
volume measures are reported in Tables 7, 9, and 11 for GPs and 8, 10, and 12 for
specialists. We also show the corresponding quantile treatment effects in Figures 3 to
5. Regarding overall drug costs, we present overall estimates implied by the normalized
volumes and price measures in the first two columns of Tables 7 and 8. While the esti-
mates in the first column are based on all drugs, in the second column, we exclude all
drugs where no DDDs are available. Finally, the third column shows estimates of the
overall effect given drug costs based on ex-factory prices and actual packages for all drugs
(section IV.D only considers costs of drugs where DDDs are available). The volume and
substitution responses based on different volume and price measures are shown in Tables
9 (10) and 11 (12) for GPs (medical specialists).
Note that comparisons of the coefficients are difficult due to the different normaliza-
tions. Thus, we focus on the relative effects. Regarding drug costs of the GPs (specialists),
we find an average effect of dispensing on the treated in the order of 40% to 52% (31% to
62%) which is driven by a positive volume effect of 52% to 55% (60% to 72%).14 The price
effect is negative and ranges from −0.5% to −11% (−0.6% to −33%) although the effect
is not statistically significant for the normalized price. These results are in line with our
main findings. The positive volume effect dominates the (weakly) negative price effect so
that physician dispensing increases overall drug costs. The same conclusion holds for the
quantile treatment effects where we find very similar pictures across normalization meth-
ods. Again, the only exception are the normalized price estimates where we find positive
effects in the left tail of the outcome distribution and almost no statistically significant
effect for GPs and specialists. However, this does not alter our main conclusion that the
positive effect on drug costs is driven by an increase in the drug volume.
Overall, the results in this section confirm our previous findings, emphasizing the
14Note that Kaiser and Schmid (2016) find an overall effect of 34% which is close to the estimates
presented in the last column of Table 8. Hence, restricting the data to drugs for which DDDs are available
might lead to an overestimation of the overall effect in the medical specialists population.
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robustness of our main results in terms of normalization method and drugs included.
V. CONCLUSION
Physicians have been shown to respond to changes in reimbursement schemes by influ-
encing the volume and the composition of services they provided. This paper provides
some of the first market-level evidence on the relative importance of the volume and
the substitution response. We investigate the physician drug dispensing regulations in
Switzerland. To empirically disentangle and quantify the volume and the substitution
response, we exploit the institutional setting in Switzerland, which is characterized by a
combination of federal regulations and regional variation in the dispensing regime, and a
novel market-level dataset on physician descriptions.
Three major conclusions can be drawn from our analysis. First, physician dispensing
has a larger impact on drug costs (in absolute terms) for GPs than for specialists. Second,
the volume response empirically dominates the substitution response. In other words, the
permission to dispense drugs causes physicians to sell more drugs but not necessarily
to sell more expensive drugs. Third, we find substantial heterogeneity in the impact of
dispensing along the outcome distributions. From a policy perspective, the most relevant
insight of our paper is the relative importance of the volume response, indicating that
policies that target the volume are likely to be more effective than price regulations for
containing healthcare costs.
There are some limitations to our analysis. First, dispensing physicians potentially
face additional financial incentives that are unobserved. For instance, they might receive
kick backs or discounts on the ex-factory price. Second, we cannot quantify the impact
of dispensing on health outcomes. Both issues could be tackled if more detailed data
were available. Third, our results show that there is a lot of heterogeneity in the causal
effect of dispensing within and between different types of physicians. While we are not
powered to perform a detailed subgroup analysis, a further analysis of the extent and the
determinants of this effect heterogeneity is certainly worth pursuing in future research.
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und Luzern. Propharmacie, Cahiers de l’IDHEAP 114.
Filippini, M., F. Heimsch, and G. Masiero (2014). Antibiotic consumption and the role
of dispensing physician. Regional Science and Urban Economics 49, 242–251.
Firpo, S. (2007). Efficient semiparametric estimation of quantile treatment effects. Econo-
metrica 75 (1), 259–276.
Financial incentives and physician prescription behavior 21
Grant, D. (2009). Physician financial incentives and cesarean delivery: New conclusions
from the healthcare cost und utilization project. Journal of Health Economics 28,
244–250.
Gruber, J., J. Kim, and D. Mayzlin (1999). Physician fees and procedure intensity: The
case of cesarean delivery. Journal of Health Economics 18, 473–490.
Hadley, J. and J. D. Reschovsky (2006). Medicare fees and physicians’ medicare ser-
vice volume: Beneficiaries treated ad services per beneficiary. International Journal of
Health Care Finance and Economics 6, 131–150.
Hellerstein, J. K. (1998). The importance of the physician in the generic versus trade-name
prescribtion decision. RAND Journal of Economics 29, 108–136.
Iizuka, T. (2007). Experts’ agency problems: Evidence from the prescription drug market
in Japan. RAND Journal of Economics 38, 844–862.
Iizuka, T. (2012). Physician agency and adoption of generic pharmaceuticals. The Amer-
ican Economic Review 102, 2826–2858.
Imbens, G. W. (2004). Nonparametric estimation of average treatment effects under
exogeneity: A review. The Review of Economics and Statistics 86, 4–29.
Imbens, G. W. and D. B. Rubin (2015). Causal Inference for Statistics, Social, and
Biomedical Sciences An Introduction. Cambridge University Press.
Imbens, G. W. and J. M. Wooldridge (2009). Recent developments in the econometrics
of program evaluation. Journal of Economic Literature 47, 5–86.
Jacobson, M., T. Y. Chang, J. P. Newhouse, and C. C. Earle (2013). Physician agency and
competition: Evidence from a major change to medicare chemotherapy reimbursement
policy. Technical report, NBER Working Paper.
Kaiser, B. and C. Schmid (2016). Does physician dispensing increase drug expenditures?
empirical evidence from switzerland. Health Economics 25 (1), 71–90.
Financial incentives and physician prescription behavior 22
Lim, D., J. Emery, J. Lewis, and V. B. Sunderland (2009). A systematic review of the
literature comparing the practices of dispensing and non-dispensing doctors. Health
Policy 92, 1–9.
Liu, Y.-M., Y.-H. K. Yang, and C.-R. Hsieh (2009). Financial incentives and physicians’
prescription decisions on the choice between brand-name and generic drugs: Evidence
from Taiwan. Journal of Health Economics 28, 341–349.
Liu, Y.-M., Y.-H. K. Yang, and C.-R. Hsieh (2012). Regulation and competition in the
taiwanese pharmaceutical market under national health insurance. Journal of Health
Economics 31, 471–483.
Lundin, D. (2000). Moral hazard in physician prescribtion behaviour. Journal of Health
Economics 19, 639–662.
McGuire, T. G. (2000). 9: Physician agency. In A. J. Culyer and J. P. Newhouse (Eds.),
Handbook of Health Economics, pp. 463–536. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Nguyen, X. N. (1996). Physician volume response to price controls. Health Policy 35 (2),
189–204.
Park, S., S. B. Soumerai, A. S. Adams, J. A. Finkelstein, S. Jang, and D. Ross-Degnan
(2005). Antibiotic use following a Korean national policy to prohibit medication dis-
pensing by physician. Health Policy and Planning 20, 302–309.
Rischatsch, M. (2013). Lead me not into temptation: Drug price regulation and dispensing
physicians in switzerland. European Journal of Health Economics .
Rischatsch, M., M. Trottmann, and P. Zweifel (2013). Generic substitution, financial
interests, and imperfect agency. International Journal of Health Care Finance and
Economics 13, 115–138.
Robins, J., M. Sued, Q. Lei-Gomez, and A. Rotnitzky (2007). Comment: Performance
of double-robust estimators when” inverse probability” weights are highly variable.
Statistical Science 22, 544–559.
Financial incentives and physician prescription behavior 23
Rubin, D. B. (1974). Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomized and nonran-
domized studies. Journal of Educational Psychology 66, 688–701.
Schmid, C. P. (2017). Unobserved healthcare expenditures: How important is censoring
in register data? Health Economics . (forthcoming).
Schmid, C. P., K. Beck, and L. Kauer (2017). Health plan payment in switzerland. In
T. G. McGuire and R. van Kleef (Eds.), Risk Adjustment, Risk Sharing and Premium
Regulation in Health Insurance Markets: Theory and Practice. Elsevier.
Trottmann, M., M. Frueh, H. Telser, and O. Reich (2016). Physician drug dispensing
in switzerland: Association on health care expenditures and utilization. BMC Health
Services Research 16 (238), 1–11.
Van de Ven, W. P., K. Beck, F. Buchner, E. Schut, A. Shmueli, and J. Wasem (2013).
Preconditions for efficiency and affordability in competitive healthcare markets: Are
they fulfilled in belgium, germany, israel, the netherlands and switzerland? Health
Policy 109 (3), 226–245.
Van Doorslaer, E. and J. Geurts (1987). Supplier-induced demand for physiotherapy in
the Netherlands. Social Science & Medicine 24, 919–925.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2007). Inverse probability weighted estimation for general missing
data problems. Journal of Econometrics 141, 1281–1301.
Yip, W. C. (1998). Physician response to medicare fee reductions: Changes in volume
of coronary artery bypass graft (cabg) surgeries in the medicare and private sectors.
Journal of Health Economics 17 (6), 675–699.
24
Appendix
A FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1: Kernel densities of estimated propensity scores
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Figure 2: Quantile treatment effects of dispensing, 2008-2012
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(a) General practitioners, costs per patient
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(b) Specialists, costs per patient
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(c) General practitioners, volume per patient
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(d) Specialists, volume per patient
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(e) General practitioners, average drug price
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(f) Specialists, average drug price
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Figure 3: Quantile treatment effects using different measures of drug costs
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(a) General practitioners, normalized
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(b) Specialists, normalized
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(c) General practitioners, normalized (DDD)
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(d) Specialists, normalized (DDD)
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(e) General practitioners, drug costs in CHF
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(f) Specialists, drug costs in CHF
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Figure 4: Quantile treatment effects using different measures of drug volumes
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(a) General practitioners, normalized
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(b) Specialists, normalized
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(c) General practitioners, normalized (DDD)
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3 .35 .4 .45 .5 .55 .6 .65 .7 .75 .8 .85 .9 .95 1
quantile
QTE (95% confidence interval)
QTT (95% confidence interval)
(d) Specialists, normalized (DDD)
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(e) General practitioners, volume index
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(f) Specialists, volume index
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Figure 5: Quantile treatment effects using different measures of drug prices
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(a) General practitioners, normalized
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(b) Specialists, normalized
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(c) General practitioners, normalized (DDD)
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Figure 5 (Continued): Quantile treatment effects using different measures of drug prices
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(e) General practitioners, retail price (CHF)
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(f) Specialists, retail price (CHF)
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(g) General practitioners, ex-factory price (CHF)
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Table 1: Normalized differences of covariate means (2008-2012)
General Practitioners Specialists
Full sample CS sample Full sample CS sample
Physician characteristics
Female −0.144 −0.106 −0.028 0.002
German nationality 0.046 0.026 0.119 0.069
Other foreign nationality 0.012 0.008 −0.018 −0.004
Age −0.076 −0.037 −0.126 −0.052
Work experience −0.017 −0.008 −0.070 −0.030
Patient pool variables
# patients 0.304 0.229 0.340 0.238
# visits 0.266 0.213 0.324 0.254
Patients’ average age −0.021 0.002 0.023 −0.002
Cases aged >80 years −0.017 0.010 0.060 0.041
Cases aged 66-80 years 0.122 0.091 0.064 0.020
Cases aged <25 years −0.012 −0.028 −0.015 0.001
Cases of men 0.173 0.126 −0.062 −0.030
Share with deductible of CHF 500 −0.017 0.020 −0.182 −0.109
Share with deductible of CHF 1000 0.077 0.058 0.104 0.068
Share with deductible of CHF 1500 0.157 0.100 0.204 0.094
Share with deductible of CHF 2000 0.107 0.083 0.159 0.073
Share with deductible of CHF 2500 −0.078 −0.054 −0.003 −0.004
Share of children with deductibles 0.050 0.023 −0.014 −0.012
Share with insurance model HMO 0.086 0.032 0.178 0.153
Share with insurance model PPO 0.156 0.113 0.176 0.090
Share with insurance model TelMed 0.091 0.066 0.103 0.092
Characteristics of the local healthcare market
Physician density −0.502 −0.330 −0.429 −0.109
Share with very good health 0.053 0.011 0.069 0.024
Share with good health 0.025 0.027 0.029 0.004
Share with fair health −0.109 −0.063 −0.143 −0.043
Share with chronic health problems −0.096 −0.036 −0.218 −0.076
Share that needs medication −0.067 −0.019 −0.206 −0.062
Average body mass index 0.282 0.193 0.253 0.124
Share of immigrants −0.251 −0.173 −0.083 −0.019
Fraction of urban area −0.470 −0.330 −0.431 −0.227
Net income per capita 0.156 0.003 0.138 0.026
Unemployment rate −0.371 −0.245 −0.311 −0.187
Share of medium educated 0.405 0.284 0.249 0.034
Share of high educated −0.300 −0.253 −0.344 −0.151
Population density −0.473 −0.337 −0.414 −0.199
Type of physician
GP II: practice diploma −0.052 −0.026
GP III: pediatrist −0.069 −0.070
gynecologist 0.151 0.065
angiologist −0.027 −0.014
cardiologist 0.026 0.007
invasive specialist 0.086 0.029
psychiatrist −0.240 −0.108
other type of specilist −0.073 −0.045
Trimming and # obs.
alpha 0.103 0.096
# control obs. (non-dispensing) 8646 7029 12941 7859
# treated obs. (dispensing) 10936 9262 5642 4940
Notes: CS sample refers to the common support subsample (Section IV.B). Detailed definitions of
the variables can be found in Table 14. obs.: observations.
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Table 2: General practitioners’ descriptive statistics (2008-2012)
Nondispensing Dispensing
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Drug prescriptions
Costs per patient 124.330 150.306 195.514 122.974
Volume (days supplied) per patient 155.686 155.592 257.468 159.450
Average drug price (per day supplied) 0.919 1.248 0.814 0.560
Physician characteristics
Female 0.271 0.445 0.208 0.406
German nationality 0.060 0.238 0.069 0.254
Other foreign nationality 0.012 0.107 0.013 0.113
Age 52.136 8.686 51.679 8.523
Work experience 16.601 9.211 16.494 8.837
Patient pool variables
# patients 923.446 581.994 1109.383 565.168
# visits 3788.582 2321.423 4482.523 2296.373
# visits per patient 4.404 2.008 4.210 1.514
Patients’ average age 44.412 15.882 44.444 13.431
Cases aged >80 years 0.115 0.098 0.116 0.077
Cases aged 66-80 years 0.207 0.118 0.221 0.105
Cases aged <25 years 0.222 0.300 0.211 0.258
Cases of men 0.407 0.120 0.426 0.101
Share with deductible of CHF 500 0.160 0.091 0.163 0.082
Share with deductible of CHF 1000 0.023 0.017 0.025 0.014
Share with deductible of CHF 1500 0.054 0.036 0.059 0.031
Share with deductible of CHF 2000 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009
Share with deductible of CHF 2500 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.019
Share of children with deductibles 0.009 0.015 0.009 0.013
Share with insurance model HMO 0.047 0.078 0.050 0.076
Share with insurance model PPO 0.287 0.129 0.306 0.118
Share with insurance model TelMed 0.030 0.034 0.033 0.035
Characteristics of the local healthcare market
Physician density 3.371 1.641 2.551 1.872
Share with very good health 0.190 0.062 0.191 0.072
Share with good health 0.646 0.067 0.649 0.077
Share with fair health 0.141 0.048 0.137 0.049
Share with chronic health problems 0.372 0.072 0.369 0.067
Share that needs medication 0.409 0.075 0.406 0.081
Average body mass index 24.430 0.734 24.641 0.815
Share of immigrants 0.209 0.072 0.191 0.071
Fraction of urban area 0.318 0.186 0.242 0.136
Net income per capita 75.945 8.880 75.981 10.279
Unemployment rate 2.703 0.683 2.454 0.748
Share of medium educated 0.510 0.044 0.525 0.033
Share of high educated 0.213 0.046 0.197 0.042
Population density 0.091 0.924 −0.332 0.853
# observations 7029 9262
Notes: Based on the common support subsample and averaged across the period 2008-
2012. The variables are measured annually on the physician level. Detailed definitions
of the variables can be found in Table 14. Std. Dev.: Standard Deviation.
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Table 3: Specialists’ descriptive statistics (2008-2012)
Nondispensing Dispensing
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Drug prescriptions
Costs per patient 85.949 187.704 127.071 218.567
Volume (days supplied) per patient 51.357 86.568 85.403 123.111
Average drug price (per day supplied) 1.877 4.182 1.534 1.590
Physician characteristics
Female 0.293 0.455 0.295 0.456
German nationality 0.110 0.313 0.142 0.349
Other foreign nationality 0.018 0.133 0.017 0.131
Age 51.235 8.649 50.620 7.980
Work experience 15.939 8.529 15.599 7.683
Patient pool variables
# patients 783.142 811.729 1076.456 930.581
# visits 2051.342 1779.419 2705.850 1864.862
# visits per patient 4.651 4.086 3.975 3.270
Patients’ average age 49.556 10.429 49.529 8.636
Cases aged >80 years 0.055 0.065 0.059 0.063
Cases aged 66-80 years 0.189 0.147 0.193 0.140
Cases aged <25 years 0.121 0.164 0.122 0.121
Cases of men 0.355 0.206 0.346 0.201
Share with deductible of CHF 500 0.175 0.070 0.166 0.057
Share with deductible of CHF 1000 0.029 0.021 0.031 0.019
Share with deductible of CHF 1500 0.074 0.049 0.080 0.047
Share with deductible of CHF 2000 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.013
Share with deductible of CHF 2500 0.038 0.033 0.037 0.029
Share of children with deductibles 0.005 0.013 0.005 0.009
Share with insurance model HMO 0.051 0.059 0.066 0.071
Share with insurance model PPO 0.254 0.122 0.269 0.105
Share with insurance model TelMed 0.035 0.041 0.040 0.042
Characteristics of the local healthcare market
Physician density 3.173 0.972 2.987 1.414
Share with very good health 0.187 0.044 0.189 0.051
Share with good health 0.650 0.050 0.650 0.060
Share with fair health 0.139 0.039 0.137 0.039
Share with chronic health problems 0.374 0.054 0.368 0.052
Share that needs medication 0.412 0.061 0.406 0.065
Average body mass index 24.518 0.707 24.641 0.689
Share of immigrants 0.207 0.054 0.206 0.044
Fraction of urban area 0.309 0.137 0.269 0.105
Net income per capita 79.328 11.553 79.780 12.828
Unemployment rate 2.676 0.534 2.536 0.521
Share of medium educated 0.514 0.034 0.515 0.020
Share of high educated 0.216 0.042 0.207 0.038
Population density 0.173 0.719 −0.017 0.624
# observations 7859 4940
Notes: Based on the common support subsample and averaged across the period 2008-
2012. The variables are measured annually on the physician level. Detailed definitions
of the variables can be found in Table 14. Std. Dev.: Standard Deviation.
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Table 4: General practitioners’ causal effects of dispensing, 2008-2012
Costs per patient Volume per patient Average drug price
% of % of % of
Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean
Unadjusted difference 71.18∗∗∗ 3.60 57.25 101.78∗∗∗ 4.58 65.38 −0.11∗∗∗ 0.03 −11.44
Average treatment effect
Weighted least squares 68.45∗∗∗ 4.11 55.06 90.31∗∗∗ 4.77 58.00 −0.04∗∗ 0.02 −4.74
Weighted PQML 68.50∗∗∗ 3.56 55.10 91.64∗∗∗ 4.01 58.86 −0.04∗ 0.02 −4.66
Average treatment effect on the treated
Weighted least squares 64.56∗∗∗ 4.74 51.93 86.58∗∗∗ 6.61 55.61 −0.04∗∗ 0.02 −4.46
Weighted PQML 66.66∗∗∗ 4.18 53.61 89.07∗∗∗ 5.19 57.21 −0.04∗∗ 0.02 −4.31
Notes: The estimation sample consists of 16291 observations from the years 2008-2012 that lie in the
common support subsample. The outcomes are measured annually on the physician level. Standard
errors are block bootstrapped on the physician level using 250 replications. PQML: Poisson quasi-
maximum likelihood. Coef.: Coefficient. S.E.: Standard Error. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
Table 5: Specialists’ causal effects of dispensing, 2008-2012
Costs per patient Volume per patient Average drug price
% of % of % of
Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean
Unadjusted difference 41.12∗∗∗ 8.36 47.85 34.05∗∗∗ 4.37 66.30 −0.34∗∗∗ 0.08 −18.27
Average treatment effect
Weighted least squares 53.71∗∗∗ 7.59 62.49 42.21∗∗∗ 3.67 82.19 −0.37∗∗∗ 0.08 −19.72
Weighted PQML 50.69∗∗∗ 6.80 58.97 41.41∗∗∗ 3.41 80.63 −0.37∗∗∗ 0.08 −19.80
Average treatment effect on the treated
Weighted least squares 48.21∗∗∗ 7.88 56.09 38.17∗∗∗ 3.75 74.33 −0.38∗∗∗ 0.11 −20.04
Weighted PQML 46.02∗∗∗ 7.10 53.54 37.72∗∗∗ 3.39 73.46 −0.41∗∗∗ 0.13 −21.65
Notes: The estimation sample consists of 12799 observations from the years 2008-2012 that lie in the
common support subsample. The outcomes are measured annually on the physician level. Standard
errors are block bootstrapped on the physician level using 250 replications. PQML: Poisson quasi-
maximum likelihood. Coef.: Coefficient. S.E.: Standard Error. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
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Table 6: Causal effects estimated with OLS, PQML, and IPW (2008–2012)
General practitioners Costs per patient Volume per patient Average drug price
% of % of % of
Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean
Unadjusted difference 71.18∗∗∗ 3.60 57.25 101.78∗∗∗ 4.58 65.38 −0.11∗∗∗ 0.03 −11.44
Average treatment effect
Least squares 68.20∗∗∗ 3.41 54.86 90.00∗∗∗ 4.03 57.81 −0.05∗ 0.03 −4.98
PQML 69.03∗∗∗ 3.37 55.52 91.50∗∗∗ 4.16 58.77 −0.04∗ 0.03 −4.85
IPW 72.92∗∗∗ 3.94 58.65 96.92∗∗∗ 4.49 62.25 −0.05∗∗ 0.02 −5.71
Average treatment effect on the treated
Least squares 67.98∗∗∗ 3.82 54.68 90.22∗∗∗ 4.79 57.95 −0.05∗ 0.02 −5.10
PQML 69.18∗∗∗ 4.03 55.64 91.13∗∗∗ 5.24 58.53 −0.05∗∗ 0.02 −5.13
IPW 67.34∗∗∗ 3.94 54.16 91.77∗∗∗ 5.20 58.95 −0.05∗∗∗ 0.02 −5.84
Specialists Costs per patient Volume per patient Average drug price
% of % of % of
Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean
Unadjusted difference 41.12∗∗∗ 8.36 47.85 34.05∗∗∗ 4.37 66.30 −0.34∗∗∗ 0.08 −18.27
Average treatment effect
Least squares 54.32∗∗∗ 7.46 63.20 42.94∗∗∗ 3.71 83.61 −0.39∗∗∗ 0.08 −20.78
PQML 51.43∗∗∗ 6.88 59.84 41.73∗∗∗ 3.36 81.26 −0.38∗∗∗ 0.08 −20.48
IPW 57.00∗∗∗ 8.28 66.32 44.26∗∗∗ 4.03 86.17 −0.36∗∗∗ 0.08 −19.26
Average treatment effect on the treated
Least squares 50.92∗∗∗ 7.24 59.25 40.59∗∗∗ 3.58 79.04 −0.42∗∗∗ 0.11 −22.15
PQML 47.91∗∗∗ 6.55 55.74 38.89∗∗∗ 3.33 75.72 −0.41∗∗∗ 0.11 −21.96
IPW 42.85∗∗∗ 8.06 49.85 34.58∗∗∗ 3.94 67.33 −0.35∗∗∗ 0.09 −18.47
Notes: The estimation sample consists of 16291 (12799) observations for GPs (specialists) from the
years 2008-2012 that lie in the common support subsample. The outcomes are measured annually
on the physician level. Standard errors are block bootstrapped on the physician level using 250
replications. OLS: Ordinary least squares. PQML: Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood. IPW: Inverse
probability weighting. Coef.: Coefficient. S.E.: Standard Error.
Significance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
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Table 7: General practitioners’ average effects using different measures of drug costs
Normalized Normalized (DDD) Drug costs in CHF
% of % of % of
Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean
Unadjusted difference 24.99∗∗∗ 1.19 58.52 1138.40∗∗∗ 68.80 49.97 133.45∗∗∗ 6.43 56.06
Average treatment effect
Weighted least squares 22.54∗∗∗ 1.27 52.78 1012.82∗∗∗ 77.41 44.46 127.56∗∗∗ 6.91 53.58
Weighted PQML 22.97∗∗∗ 1.13 53.79 1012.70∗∗∗ 76.93 44.45 128.54∗∗∗ 5.68 54.00
Average treatment effect on the treated
Weighted least squares 21.19∗∗∗ 1.85 49.63 914.09∗∗∗ 98.39 40.12 119.20∗∗∗ 8.56 50.07
Weighted PQML 22.15∗∗∗ 1.33 51.87 930.06∗∗∗ 96.59 40.82 123.35∗∗∗ 6.09 51.82
Notes: The estimation sample consists of 16291 observations from the years 2008-2012 that lie in the
common support subsample. The outcomes are measured annually on the physician level. Standard
errors are block bootstrapped on the physician level using 250 replications. PQML: Poisson quasi-
maximum likelihood. Coef.: Coefficient. S.E.: Standard Error. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
Table 8: Specialists’ average effects using different measures of drug costs
Normalized Normalized (DDD) Drug costs in CHF
% of % of % of
Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean
Unadjusted difference 9.61∗∗∗ 1.24 56.95 394.35∗∗ 157.19 33.47 55.97∗∗∗ 19.45 31.53
Average treatment effect
Weighted least squares 11.70∗∗∗ 1.13 69.31 491.09∗∗∗ 150.72 41.68 67.07∗∗∗ 18.73 37.78
Weighted PQML 11.55∗∗∗ 1.07 68.43 505.88∗∗∗ 144.51 42.93 67.01∗∗∗ 16.42 37.75
Average treatment effect on the treated
Weighted least squares 9.96∗∗∗ 1.52 59.03 514.19∗∗∗ 154.10 43.64 55.45∗∗ 21.85 31.24
Weighted PQML 10.50∗∗∗ 1.09 62.18 520.11∗∗∗ 154.54 44.14 60.21∗∗∗ 19.63 33.92
Notes: The estimation sample consists of 12799 observations from the years 2008-2012 that lie in the
common support subsample. The outcomes are measured annually on the physician level. Standard
errors are block bootstrapped on the physician level using 250 replications. PQML: Poisson quasi-
maximum likelihood. Coef.: Coefficient. S.E.: Standard Error. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
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Table 9: General practitioners’ average effects using different measures of drug volumes
Normalized Normalized (DDD) Volume index
% of % of % of
Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean
Unadjusted difference 13.87∗∗∗ 0.61 61.25 228.12∗∗∗ 11.93 61.62 4.04∗∗∗ 0.17 59.98
Average treatment effect
Weighted least squares 12.68∗∗∗ 0.76 55.98 209.91∗∗∗ 11.90 56.70 3.83∗∗∗ 0.20 56.89
Weighted PQML 12.89∗∗∗ 0.58 56.90 211.39∗∗∗ 10.99 57.10 3.87∗∗∗ 0.17 57.50
Average treatment effect on the treated
Weighted least squares 11.85∗∗∗ 0.99 52.30 196.99∗∗∗ 15.19 53.21 3.51∗∗∗ 0.28 52.17
Weighted PQML 12.32∗∗∗ 0.70 54.39 202.51∗∗∗ 12.69 54.71 3.63∗∗∗ 0.21 53.94
Notes: The estimation sample consists of 16291 observations from the years 2008-2012 that lie in the
common support subsample. The outcomes are measured annually on the physician level. Standard
errors are block bootstrapped on the physician level using 250 replications. PQML: Poisson quasi-
maximum likelihood. Coef.: Coefficient. S.E.: Standard Error. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
Table 10: Specialists’ average effects using different measures of drug volumes
Normalized Normalized (DDD) Volume index
% of % of % of
Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean
Unadjusted difference 5.82∗∗∗ 0.74 59.04 95.56∗∗∗ 11.81 66.98 1.60∗∗∗ 0.16 60.59
Average treatment effect
Weighted least squares 7.16∗∗∗ 0.78 72.72 121.18∗∗∗ 11.38 84.94 1.87∗∗∗ 0.14 70.49
Weighted PQML 7.05∗∗∗ 0.66 71.57 117.69∗∗∗ 9.93 82.49 1.87∗∗∗ 0.12 70.70
Average treatment effect on the treated
Weighted least squares 5.96∗∗∗ 0.82 60.49 101.90∗∗∗ 11.69 71.42 1.62∗∗∗ 0.15 61.20
Weighted PQML 6.34∗∗∗ 0.63 64.33 102.10∗∗∗ 10.97 71.56 1.69∗∗∗ 0.13 63.77
Notes: The estimation sample consists of 12799 observations from the years 2008-2012 that lie in the
common support subsample. The outcomes are measured annually on the physician level. Standard
errors are block bootstrapped on the physician level using 250 replications. PQML: Poisson quasi-
maximum likelihood. Coef.: Coefficient. S.E.: Standard Error. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
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Table 11: General practitioners’ average effects using different measures of drug prices
Normalized Normalized (DDD) Retail price (CHF) Ex-factory price (CHF)
% of % of % of % of
Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean
Unadjusted difference −0.01 0.01 −0.54 −1.06∗∗∗ 0.33 −15.35 −2.50∗∗∗ 0.81 −5.14 −2.01∗∗∗ 0.64 −6.21
Average treatment effect
Weighted least squares −0.01 0.01 −0.65 −0.93∗∗∗ 0.23 −13.40 −2.14∗∗∗ 0.69 −4.39 −1.67∗∗∗ 0.59 −5.13
Weighted PQML −0.01 0.01 −0.64 −0.89∗∗∗ 0.20 −12.80 −2.12∗∗∗ 0.69 −4.35 −1.65∗∗∗ 0.59 −5.07
Average treatment effect on the treated
Weighted least squares −0.01 0.01 −0.48 −0.79∗∗∗ 0.21 −11.42 −1.48∗∗ 0.59 −3.04 −1.16∗∗ 0.52 −3.56
Weighted PQML −0.01 0.01 −0.46 −0.75∗∗∗ 0.19 −10.85 −1.41∗∗ 0.57 −2.90 −1.09∗∗ 0.50 −3.37
Notes: The estimation sample consists of 16291 observations from the years 2008-2012 that lie in the common support subsample.
The outcomes are measured annually on the physician level. Standard errors are block bootstrapped on the physician level using 250
replications. PQML: Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood. Coef.: Coefficient. S.E.: Standard Error. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
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Table 12: Specialists’ average effects using different measures of drug prices
Normalized Normalized (DDD) Retail price (CHF) Ex-factory price (CHF)
% of % of % of % of
Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean
Unadjusted difference −0.03∗∗ 0.01 −1.74 −2.38∗∗∗ 0.68 −23.17 −12.68∗∗∗ 2.90 −17.20 −10.76∗∗∗ 2.75 −19.97
Average treatment effect
Weighted least squares −0.02 0.01 −0.92 −2.97∗∗∗ 0.86 −28.95 −13.35∗∗∗ 3.55 −18.10 −11.66∗∗∗ 2.87 −21.63
Weighted PQML −0.01 0.01 −0.85 −2.61∗∗∗ 0.83 −25.47 −13.39∗∗∗ 3.38 −18.16 −11.63∗∗∗ 2.96 −21.57
Average treatment effect on the treated
Weighted least squares −0.01 0.01 −0.63 −3.24∗∗∗ 1.24 −31.61 −13.77∗∗∗ 4.43 −18.67 −12.13∗∗∗ 3.95 −22.51
Weighted PQML −0.01 0.01 −0.59 −3.40∗∗∗ 1.24 −33.15 −14.69∗∗∗ 5.31 −19.93 −12.99∗∗∗ 4.83 −24.10
Notes: The estimation sample consists of 12799 observations from the years 2008-2012 that lie in the common support subsample.
The outcomes are measured annually on the physician level. Standard errors are block bootstrapped on the physician level using 250
replications. PQML: Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood. Coef.: Coefficient. S.E.: Standard Error. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
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B DRUG DISPENSING REGULATION
Table 13: Physician Dispensing Regulations (1820–2012)
Canton Initial dispensing regulation
(year of enactment)1
Regulation 2008-2012 (year of
enactment)2
Zurich allowed (1854) banned in the cities Zurich and Win-
terthur until 2012, otherwise allowed
(1951)
Bern allowed (1865) banned in communities where at
least two pharmacies guarantee
emergency supply, otherwise al-
lowed (1984)
Lucerne unknown4 allowed (1981)
Uri allowed (1823)
Schwyz allowed (1878)
Obwalden allowed (1955)
Nidwalden allowed (1973)
Glarus allowed (1953)
Zug allowed (1912)
Fribourg unknown4 banned (1943)3
Solothurn allowed (1857)
Basel-Stadt banned (1879)3 banned (1960)
Basel-Landschaft allowed (1865)
Schaffhausen allowed (1856) banned in communities with
more than two pharmacies (i.e.
Schaffhausen and Neuhausen),
otherwise allowed (1970)
Appenzell A. Rh. allowed (1865)
Appenzell I. Rh. allowed (2000)
St. Gallen unknown4 allowed (1979)
Graubünden allowed (1848) banned in communities where
at least one pharmacy guaran-
tees emergency supply, otherwise
allowed (1985)
Aargau banned (1919)3
Thurgau allowed (1850)
Ticino unknown4 banned
Vaud banned (1810)3
Valais banned (1896)3
Neuchâtel banned (1984)
Genève unknown4 banned (2006)
Jura unknown4 banned (1990)3
Notes: This table is an updated version of Table A.I. of Kaiser and Schmid (2016)
1 Before any regulation existed, physician dispensing was generally allowed.
2 Where no changes are mentioned, the regulation in 2012 corresponds to the initial
regulation.
3 Exceptions depend on the availability of pharmacies.
4 Cantonal authorities and archives did not provide any information.
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C SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND CONSTRUCTION
Table 14: Variable Definitions and Construction
Variable Name Description/Construction Aggre-
gation
Source
drug costs per patient Annual gross drug costs per patient resulting from prescriptions of a physician,
including direct costs induced by dispensing as well as indirect costs originating
from prescriptions filled in pharmacies.
Sasis AG
days supplied, per patient a physician’s annual prescribed (and dispensed) drug volume per patient in terms
of days supplied based on defined daily doses
WHO, Sasis
AG, SL
price per day supplied average price per day supplied by a physician based on defined daily doses and the
ex-factory price of the drug package
WHO, Sasis
AG, SL
normalized volume, per
patient
a physician’s annual prescribed drug volume per patient in terms of standardized
packages based on the active pharmaceutical ingredient. Section IV.E.1 outlines
the construction of the variable in detail.
Sasis AG, SL
normalized price the annual average drug price over all prescriptions issued by a physician, based on
standardized packages based on active pharmaceutical ingredient and ex-factory
prices. Section IV.E.1 outlines the construction of the variable in detail.
Sasis AG, SL
volume index, per patient a physician’s annual prescribed drug volume per patient in terms of standardized
package sizes between one (smallest package) and two (largest package) based on
active pharmaceutical ingredients. Section IV.E.1 outlines the construction of the
variable in detail.
Sasis AG, SL
dispensing status, Di =1, if physician runs a dispensary in his practice, =0 otherwise. MedReg
female =1 if physician is female, =0 if physician is male MedReg
German nationality =1 if physician has German nationality, =0 otherwise MedReg
other foreign nationality =1 if physician has foreign nationality other than German, =0 otherwise MedReg
age current year - year of graduation from medical school + 26, where 26 is the average
age at graduation
MedReg
work experience current year - year of attainment of specialty title MedReg
# patients the total number of patients who come to the physician’s office in a calendar year Sasis AG
# visits the total number of visits to the physician’s office in a calendar year Sasis AG
# visits per patient # visits/# patients Sasis AG
patients’ average age sum of patients’ age/# patients Sasis AG
cases aged > 80y # visits by patients aged above 80/# visits Sasis AG
cases aged 66− 80y # visits by patients aged btw. 66-80/# visits Sasis AG
Continued on next page
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Table 14 – Continued from previous page
Variable Name Description/Construction Aggre-
gation
Source
cases aged < 25y # visits by patients aged below 25/# visits Sasis AG
cases of males # visits by male patients/# visits Sasis AG
share with deductible of
CHF X
The share of patients with deductibles of CHF X = 500, 1000, 1500, 2000, or 2500
per year. The ordinary deductible for adults is CHF 300 per year.
Sasis AG
share of children with de-
ductibles
The share of children patients with non-zero deductibles. The ordinary deductible
for children aged younger than 18 years is CHF 0.
Sasis AG
share with insurance
model HMO
The share of patients with an HMO (Health Maintenance Organization) health
insurance plan.
Sasis AG
share with insurance
model PPO
The share of patients with a PPO (Preferred Provider Organization) health insur-
ance plan.
Sasis AG
share with insurance
model TelMed
The share of patients with a TelMed health insurance plan (insurance plan where
the patient has to call a consultation hotline before seeing a doctor).
Sasis AG
physician density The physician density is the total number of physicians per 1000 inhabitants in a
municipality.
1 MedReg,
SFSO
share with very good
health
The share of the population who self-report very good health in the region. 2 SHP
share with good health The share of the population who self-report good health in the region. 2 SHP
share with fair health The share of the population who self-report fair health in the region. 2 SHP
share with chronic health
problems
The share of the population who self-report chronic illness or long-term health
problems in the region.
2 SHP
share that needs medica-
tion
The share of the population who self-report the need for medication for everyday
functioning in the region.
2 SHP
average body mass index The average Body Mass Index in the region. It is calculated from the self-reported
body weight and height.
2 SHP
share of immigrants percentage of non-Swiss citizens in the permanent resident population of a munic-
ipality
1 SFSO
fraction of urban area percentage of urbanized acreage relative to total acreage of a municipality 1 SFSO
net income per capita average net income per-capita (2008) in 1,000 Swiss francs in municipality 1 SFFA, SFSO
unemployment rate percentage of unemployed in total workforce in municipality 1 SFSO
share of medium educated percentage of vocational and secondary school graduates relative to total adult
population in municipality
1 SFSO
share of high educated percentage of college and university graduates relative to total adult population
in municipality
1 SFSO
population density log of population in 1000 per square kilometre in municipality 1 SFSO
Continued on next page
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Table 14 – Continued from previous page
Variable Name Description/Construction Aggre-
gation
Source
GP I: general internal
medicine
reference group. =1 if GP has a diploma in general internal medicine, =0 otherwise Sasis AG
GP II: practice diploma =1 if GP has a practice diploma (German: praktischer Arzt), =0 otherwise Sasis AG
GP III: pediatrist =1 if GP has a diploma in pediatrics, =0 otherwise Sasis AG
non-invasive specialist reference group. =1 if specialty includes dermatology, venereology, specialty for al-
lergies and immunology, endocrinology, pneumology, nephrology, neurology, hema-
tology, gastroenterology, oncology, physical medicine and rehabilitation, specialty
for infectious diseases, tropical medicine, metabolic pathology and neuropathology,
=0 otherwise
Sasis AG
gynecologist =1 if gynecologist, =0 otherwise Sasis AG
angiologist =1 if angiologist, =0 otherwise Sasis AG
cardiologist =1 if cardiologist, =0 otherwise Sasis AG
invasive specialist =1 if specialty is surgery, pediatric surgery, ophthalmology, orthopaedy, vascu-
lar surgery, urology, jaw and facial surgery, plastic surgery, or hand surgery, =0
otherwise
Sasis AG
psychiatrist =1 if psychiatrist, =0 otherwise Sasis AG
other type of specialist =1 if specialty is anesthetics, radiology, industrial medicine, pathology, pharma-
ceutical medicine, radio-oncology, intensive-care specialty, nuclear medicine, clin-
ical pharmacology and toxicology, genetics, or other non-classified specialty, =0
otherwise
Sasis AG
Aggregation 1: For each physician i, we compute a weighted average across municipalities. The share of visits at physician i’s office
attributable to people living in these municipalities is used as a weight.
Aggregation 2: For each physician i, we compute a weighted average across regions. The share of visits at physician i’s office attributable
to people living in these regions is used as a weight. Note: the SFSO divides Switzerland into 106 so-called mobility regions.
Data Sources: Sasis AG: nationwide operator of the insurance claims database of Swiss health insurers, MedReg: federal register of
medical professionals, SFSO: Swiss Federal Statistical Office, SHP: Swiss Household Panel, SFFA: Swiss Federal Finance Administration,
SL: List of Pharmaceutical Specialties, WHO: World Health Organization
